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i. Sale-Express warranty.
At the time of transfer of bank stock to plaintiff as a part of the price
of land conveyed by him, the grantee stated that the bank was organized
under the laws of Pennsylvania; that the stock was worth ioo cents on
the dollar; and that it was good, high dividend paying stock Held an
,express warranty that the stock was worth its face value, and that the
bank was duly organized as stated.
2. Same-Implied warranty.
Where a paper purporting to be a certificate of stock in a bank legally
organized, is sold as such, there is an implied warranty that the certifi-
cate is genuine, and what it purports to be.
3. Same-Evdence.
In an action for breach of warranty in a contract of sale of bank stock
that the bank was solvent, evidence as to the condition of the bank four
years after the sale is incompetent, the question involved being the
solvency of the bank at the time of the sale.
WARRANTY.
Warranty is a contract of indemnity made by the seller of
goods in favor of the buyer, to protect the latter against a
failure of one or more terms of the sale and is collateral to
the main contract.
Warranty is the same as guaranty, only the latter is made
,with reference to the solvency of the person.
i. Consideration. The contract of warranty, like other con-
' Reported in 73 Hun. 383.
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tracts, requires a sufficient consideration to support it: Benja-
min on Sales, § 61 I.
But an offer to warrant when the parties commence nego-
tiating might be sufficient, although some days elapse before
a final consummation of the bargain: Wilmot v. Hurd,
I i Wend. 584.
A warranty in a printed catalogue of an auction sale would
not ordinarily enter into the sale, if the auctioneer at the sale
and in the presence of the purchaser distinctly announces
that the seller warrants nothing: Craig v. Miller, 22 Up. Can.
C. P. 349.
Still more obviously the warranty made after a sale has
been fully made and completed, and not before promised or
understood, is invalid unless there be a new consideration:
Hogins v. Plympton, i i Pick. 99; Bloss v. Kittridge, 5 Vt. 28;
Towell v. Gate'wood, 2 Scan. 24; Summers v. Vaughan,
35 Ind. 323; Morehouse v. Comstock, 42 Wis. 626.
If a warranty has been promised at the sale, and one is
subsequently given, even after the sale is completed, it is not
void for want of consideration: Collette v. Weed, 68 Wis. 428.
If, however, the warranty be given at any time before the
sale be fully completed, it is valid. Thus, when the goods
were ordered and delivered, but no price fixed, and afterwards,
when the price was finally agreed upon a warranty was given,
it was held valid: Vincent v. Leland, IOO Mass. 432.
The question of consideration usually arises only in express
warranties, as implied warranties always arise, if at all, at the
time of sale, hence the consideration always exists; whereas,
express warranties may be made before or after the sale, and
a slight new consideration will always suffice: Porter v. Poole,
62 Ga. 238.
Thus, where the goods were not delivered at the proper
time, justifying the vendee in refusing to accept them, and the
seller said if the buyer would accept he would warrant them
against freezing, this was held binding: Conger v. Chamberlain,
14 Wis. 258.
When an agent, by an oral contract, sells and delivers the
goods of a disclosed principal, his personal oral warranty ot
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quality is not a contract independent of the contract of sale,
but is a part of it, and one consideration is sufficient to support
the sale and warranty: Johnson v. Trask, i 16 N. Y. 136.
A warranty is an incident only to a completed sale: Osborne
v. Gantz, 6o N. Y. 540; Zimmerman v. forow, 28 Minn. 367;
James v. Bokage, 45 Ark. 284.
It also follows that a warranty given after a sale has been
made is void, unless some new consideration be given for the
warranty. The consideration already given is exhausted by
the transfer of the property in the goods without a warranty,
and there is nothing to support the subsequent agreement to
warrant, unless a new consideration be given: Roscorla v.
Thomas, 3 Q. B. 234.
2. A warranty may be either express or imp i'd. An
express warranty is an affirmation by the seller of a material
fact concerning the goods sold, made under such circum-
stances that the buyer has, a right to rely upon, and does rely
upon them. It is immaterial that the seller did not intend to
make a warranty: Pasly v. Freeman, 3 Term. Rep. 51; Haw-
kins v. Pemberton, 5 1 N. Y. 198; Reed v. Hastings, 6I Ill. 266.
In order to constitute a warranty upon a sale, it is not
necessary that the representations should have been intended
by the vendor as a warranty. If the representation is clear and
positive-not a mere expression of opinion-and the vendee
understands it as a warranty, and, relying upon it, purchases,
the vendor cannot escape liability by claiming that he did not
intend what his language declared: Hawkins v. Pemberton,
5 1 N.Y. 198; Fairbank Canning Co. v. Aetzger, i 18 N.Y. 265.
Any affirmation of an existing fact, distinctly and positively
made, in negotiations for trade is deemed a warranty: Sweet
v. Bradley, 24 Barb. 549-
A warranty is a collateral undertaking and forms a part of
the contract by the agreement of the parties: Benjamin on
Sales, § 61o; and this is essential to its validity : Vincent v.
Leland, IOO Mass. 432; Wilmot v. Hurd, ii Wend. 584;
Conger v. Chamberlain, 14 Wis. 258 ; Summers v. Vaughn,
35 Ind. 323; Bryant v. Crosby, 4o Me. 9.
If a sale of property is complete and perfect by the terms of
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the written contract of sale, a subsequent warranty is void,.
unless some new consideration be given to support it. A war-
ranty to be effectual must be intended as such by the parties :
Bryant v. Crosby, 40 Me. 9; Summersv. Vaughn, 35 Ind. 323.
The right of a buyer of goods to sue upon the seller's special
warranty of their quality, accrues immediately upon the failure
of the warranty, without returning the goods, or giving any
notice to the seller: Vincent v. Leland, ioo- Mass. 432.
Where the alleged warranty is oral, it is for the jury under
proper instructions from the court, to decide upon the terms
of the contract and the existence of the ingredients necessary
to constitute a warranty: Conger v. Chamberlain, 14 Wis. 258.
3. No particular form of words is necessary. Any words
which manifest the intent of the parties: Wilbur v. Carwright,
44 Barb. 536; Chapman v. Murch, 19 Johns. 290; Grieb v.
Cole, 6o Mich. 397; Holman v. Dord, 12 Barb. 336; Folger
v. Chase, 18 Pick. 66; Beeman v. Buck, 3 Vt. 53; Roberts v.
Morgan, 2 Cow. 438; Henshaw v. Robbins, 9 Met. 83.
Any representation of the state of the thing sold, by the
defendant, or direct, express affirmation by him of its quality
or condition, showing his intention to warrant, will be suffi-
cient : Duffee v. Mason, 8 Cow. 25; Chapman v. Mz1urch, 19
Johns. 290.
A warranty will not be implied from loose conversations
between the vendor and vendee, in which the vendor may
praise his goods, or express his opinion as to their qualities,
or the advantages that may result to the vendee from the pur-
chase. No expression of opinion, however strong, would
import a warrant. But if the vendor affirms a fact, as to
essential qualities of the goods it amounts to an express war-
ranty: Henshaw v. Robbins, 9 Metc. 83.
The expression of an opinion by the seller that logs sold
will yield a certain amount of merchantable lumber, is not
a warranty, where the buyer examines for himself: Fauntelroy
v. Wilcox, 8o Ill. 477- Byrne v.Jansen, 50 Cal. 624.
A representation involving a question of law is necessarily
an opinion: Duffany v. Ferguison, 66 N. Y. 482.
In Baker v. Hlendrickson, 24 Vis. 509 the purchaser of trees
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saw them taken from the ground, and packed after long expos-
ure. The seller assured him that they would not suffer after
long exposure to the air before they were packed. Upon
these facts it was held that there was no warranty. Dickson,
C. J., said, "It is obvious that they were but mere expressions
of opinion, not intended as a warranty, nor so understood.
So in Carondolet Iron Works v. Moore, 78 Ill. 571, the descrip-
tion of iron sold as mill iron, was held no warranty that it was
such, but a mere opinion, because the buyer had examined it
before contracting : Falkner v. Lane, 58 Ga. 116 ; Robinson v.
Harvey, 82 Ill. 58; Bryan v. Crosby, 40 Me. 9; Lindsey v.
Davis, 30 Me. 4o6; Bond v. Clark, 35 Vt. 577.
It is not always easy to determine whether certain language
does or does not imply a warranty. Much will depend upon
the situation of the parties and the condition of things when
the language is used, and to which it will apply. It is certain
that the word warrant need not be used, nor any other of pre-
cisely the same meaning. It is enough if the words actu-
ally used impart an understanding on the part of the owner
that the chattel is what it is represented to be, or an equivalent
to such understanding: i Pars. Cont. 463; Roberts v. Morgan,.
2 Cowen, 438; Mason v. Chappell, 15 Grat. 572; Warren
v. Philadelphia Coal Co., 83 Pa. 437; Thorne v. McVeigh,
75 Ill. 81 ; Patrick v. Leach, 8o Neb. 530.
Every affirmation at the time of tl~e sale of personal chattels
amounts to a warranty. This seems to be now settled, not-
withstanding the old case of Chiadler v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4, as
to the sale of Bezoar Stone. It was so decided in Osgood'
v. Lewis and Berrikins v. Beran, 3 Rawle 23; and in Power
v. Barham, 4 Adolp & Ellis, 473, and even in New York,
where, in other respects, the doctrine of Chandler v. Lopus
is adhered to. It has been held, nevertheless, that any
representation of the thing sold, or direct affirmation of its
quality and condition, showing an intention to warrant, is
sufficient to amount to an express warranty: Chapman v.
iIfurch, 19 Johns. 290; Sweet v. Colgate, 20 Johns. 196.
In the case of Warren v. Philadellphia Coal Co., it was held,,
"no special form of words is necessary. The word warrant,
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though it is the one generally used, is not so technical that it
may not be supplied by others:" See Legett v. Sands Ale
Brewidng Co., 6o Ill. 158 ; Wheeler v. Read, 36 Ill. 8 I.
If a party makes representations which amount to a war-
ranty, he cannot avoid their effect by showing that he did not
intend to warrant: Smith v. Justice, 13 Wis. 6oo.
Some of the older Pennsylvania cases are very strict in their
requirements as to the language that will constitute a warranty.
In Weatherill v. Neilson, 20 Pa. 448, soda-ash was sold, the
seller's agent representing it, as he was authorized to do, to
contain "48 per cent. English test." The court refused to
admit testimony to show that the ash was far below 48 per
cent. English test, and this was sustained on writ of error on
the ground that there was nothing in the representations of
the agent, or the authority given him, to justify a finding of
warrranty.
4. If the affirmation alleged to .be a warranty is in writing
and is unambiguous, the construction of the contract is for the
court: Edwards v. Marcy, 2 Allen, 486, 490; Henshzaw v.
Robbzns, 9 Metc. 83; Rice v. Codinan, i Allen, 377; Berre-
lins v. Bevi, 3 Rawle, 23 ; I Thompson on Trials, § I 196;
Daniels v. Aldrich, 42 Mich. 58.
When the meaning of the terms used in a written contract
is ascertained, the effect and interpretation of the instrument
are to be determined by !he court, as a matter of law, and
cannot be changed or controlled by evidence of the under-
standing of the parties or the community: Hutchinson v.
Booker, 5 M. & W. 535 ; Rice v. Codman, i Allen, 380.
When a bill of parcels is given upon a sale of goods
describing the goods, or designating them by a name well
understood, such bill is to be considered as a warranty that
the goods sold are what they are thus described or designated
to be. And this rule applies, though the goods are examined
by the purchaser at or before the sale, if they are so prepared
and preseit such an appearance as to deceive skillful dealers:
Henshaw v. Robbins, su,ra.
5. If the affirmation is ambigfuous, it is a question for the
jury whether the parties understood it as a warranty or mere
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exp ression of opinion, commendation, or praise: i Tlwmzpson on
Trials, § 1197, 98; Cook v. Mosley, 13 Wend. 277; Edwards
v. Marcy, 2 Allen, 486.
"A warranty may be oral or written. When it is reduced
to writing it is the province of the court to expound it; but
when it is merely verbal, it is for the jury to interpret the
words of the witness who testifies concerning it. The court
may explain to the jury what constitutes a warranty, when it
rests altogether on oral proof; but as no particular form of
words is essential and it is mostly a question of intention of
both the vendor and vendee, that question, like any other
question of fact, must be left to the juiy:" Lindsey v. Davis,
30 Mo. 406-420.
The rule is, that whenever the vendor, at the time of sale,.
makes an assertion or representation, respecting the kind,.
quality or condition of the thing sold, upon which he intends.
that the vendee shall rely, and upon which the vendee does-
rely in making the purchase, it amounts to a warranty : Lamme
v. Gregg, i Metc. I44; Smith v. Miller, 2 Bibb. (Ky.) 617;
Dzu~fie v. -Mason, 8 Cowen, 25 ; Vernon v. Keyes, 8 East. 632-
639 ; Morrill v. Wallace, 9 N. H. 1 .L ; Foggert v. Blackweller,,
4 Ired L. (N. C.) 238.
If, however, the vendor, by what he says, merely intends-
to express an opinion or belief about the matter, and not to-
make an affirmation of the fact, the statement will not amount
to a warranty: Henson v. King, 3 Jones (N. C.), 419; Rogers
v. Ackennan, 22 Barb. 134; Osgood v. Lewis, 2 Harr. & G..
(Md.) 485; Bond v. Clark, 35 Vt. 577; T/ornton v. Thomp-.
son, 4 Grat. (Va.) 121.
6. If the contract of sale is in writing, no oral warranty-
can be shown to vary its terms: Benjamin on Sales, § 621;:
Watson v. Roode, 30 Neb. 264.
This results from the general rule of evidence that no new-
terms can be added by parol to vary a contract which the
parties have reduced to writing: Frost v. Blanchard, 97 Mass.
155; Whitmore v. Southi Boston Iron Co., 2 Allen, 58; Vilner v.
Whipple, 53 Wis. 298-304; Shepherd v. Gilroy, 46 Iowa, 193-
In lfer74am v. Fields, 24 Wis. 640, 642, the written con-
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tract contains certain express warranties. Parol evidence was
offered to establish certain other warranties, but the court
rejected it, saying that the writing was presumed to express
the whole contract as to warranties, and could not be varied
or added to by parol; See, also, Mullain v. Thomas, 43 Conn.
252.
But parol evidence is admissible to explain a written war-
ranty, for where the sale was by sample, parol evidence was
admitted to determine whether the article tendered was equal
to the sample: Hogins v. Plymton, i i Pick. 97. And, where
the sale was by description, evidence was admitted to deter-
mine whether the article delivered answered to the description:
Stoop v. Smith, IOO Mass. 134.
If the article is sold by a formal written contract, or a regu-
lar bill of sale, which is silent on the subject of warranty, no
-oral warranty made at the same time, or even previously, can
be shown, since the writing is conclusively presumed to embody
the whole contract. Fur the same reason no additional war-
ranty can be engrafted on or added to one that is written:
Lamb v. Crafts, 12 Met. 353; Reed v. Wood, 9 Vt. 286;
Boardman v. Spooner, 13 Allen, 253 ; Dean v. Mason, 4 Conn.
432; Frost v. Blanchard, 97 Mass. 155; McQuaid v. Ross,
77 Wis. 470; DeWitt v. Berry, 134 U. S. 312; Eighmie v.
Taylor, 98 N. Y. 288; Jones v. Alley, 17 Minn. 292.
Thus, where the written warranty was only to the age and
soundness of a horse, oral statements as to his "docility" were
held not admissible: Yullain v. Thomas, 43 Conn. 252.
A written warranty, gratuitously given after a sale, and
therefore void, will not limit an oral and different one given at
the time of the sale: Altman v. Kennedy, 33 Minn. 339.
7. A general warranty does not usually eztend to patent
and obvious defects, but such defects may be made the subject
,of the warranty, if the party so intends: Benjamin on Sales,
,616, 618; Hill' v. North, 34 Vt. 6o4; Williams v. Ingram,
21 Tex. 300; McCbrmick v. Kelly, 28 Minn. 137; Bennett v.
Buchen, 76 N. Y. 386.
But it is conceived that if obvious defects are not covered by
a general warranty it is simply from the presumption that the
.7o6
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buyer does not rely upon it, which is an essential element to
make any warranty binding. In the nature of things, one
cannot rely upon the truth of that which he knows to be
untrue, and to a purchaser fully knowing the facts in respect
to the property, misrepresentation could not have been an
inducement or consideration for the purchase, and hence could
not have been a part of the contract. But there seems to be
no good reason why a warranty may not cover obvious defects
as well as others, if the vendor is willing to give it, and the
buyer is willing to buy defective property on the assurance of
the warranty. If he relies on his own judgment alone, he
does not rely on his warranty; if he relies on the warranty
alone or in part, he is not without remedy because the infirmi-
ties are apparent: .Pinney v. Andrews, 41 Vt. 631 ; First Nat'l
Bank v. Grindstaff, 45 Ind. 158; Fletc/hcr v. Young, 69
Ga. 591.
" It is absolutely true, in regard to implied warranties, that
no implication of warranty arises when the defect is obvious to
the senses, because such defects are, or should be known to
the buyer; but the rule may be different as to express, espe-
cially as to written warranties specially covering the defect.
Such contracts are to be construed most strongly against the
warrantor; and, for ought that is known, the warranty was
demanded and given expressly to cover existing and known
defects. Evidence that the defect was obvious and known to
the buyer and so excepted from the operation of the warranty,
which in terms is broad enough to cover it, is apparently no
less than limiting a written contract by parol agreement. In
the one case, the written contract is limited from a mere infer-
ence from the facts; in the other, it is controlled by the oral
agreement of the parties: in both, the written contract is
altered and an effect is given to it different from its obvious
meaning on its face. But, if a warranty never covers an
obvious defect the rule does not apply unless th" ex-tent, as well
as the mere existence of the disease or defect is also known to
the purchaser. If the want of a tail or an ear or a leg of a
horse is not covered by a general warranty, yet a defect in the
eye, for instance, or a splint on the leg, though visible, may
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afterwards prove to be so serious as to be covered by the war-
ranty :" Shewalter v. Ford, 34 Miss. 417.
The defect, to be obvious, must be discernible by an ordin-
ary observer examining the property with a view to purchase
and not one requiring special skill to detect it: Birdseye v.
Frost, 34 Barb. 367; -Thompson v. Harvey, 86 Ala. 522;.
Drew v. Ellison, 6o Vt. 4oi; Vates v. Cornelia, 59 Wis. 615.
Of course, if the seller uses some artifice, conceals defects
otherwise visible, or misrepresents a character, his general war-
ranty may cover them: Kenner v. Harding, 85 Ill. 264;
Chadsey v. Greene, 24 Conn. 562.
A temporary and curable injury, existing at the sale, but
which does not at the time injuriously affect the natural useful-
ness and fitness of a horse for service, even if it be a fault, is
not a breach of warranty of soundness: Roberts v. Jenkins, 2 1
N. H. i 16. In Korngay v. White, io Ala. 255, it was held
that any disease, which effects the value of the animal, whether
permanent or temporary, is an unsoundness. Approved in.
Roberts v.Jenkins, 21 N. H. 119. But, whether this be so or
not, it is clear that disease need not be incurable, in order to
be an unsoundness: Thompson v. Bertrand, 23 Ark. 73 1.
Lameness may or may not be unsoundness. If permanent,.
it is; if only accidental and temporary, it is not: Browne v.
Bigelow, IO Allen, 242.
Ordinarily, a warranty is understood to apply only to the
state of things existing at the very time of the sale: Miller v.
McDonald, I3 Wis. 673; Leggettv. Sands Ale Co., 6o Ill. 15 8;
Bowman v. Clumer, 50 Ind. IO.
8. Warranties by agents. Auctioneers, known to be such,
have not ordinarily authority to warrant and bind the owner.
Blood v. French, 9 Gray, 198; Schell v. Stephens, 50 Mo. 375;
Court v. Snyder, 28 N. E. Rep. 718; Dodd v. Farlow,
I i Allen, 426.
And generally, it may be said, that a mere speciai agent "to-
sell," has not, in the absence of any express authority, or any
usage or custom to that effect, power to warrant and bind the-
principal in a sale of an article open to inspection: Cooley v.
Perrine, 41 N. J. Law, 322; Smitlt v. Tracey, 36 N. Y. 79;.
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State v. Fredericks, 47 N. J. Law, 469; Herring v. Shaggs,
73 Ala. 446.
If the articles are usually warranted when sold by the
owner, it mny be that an agent to sell may be supposed to
have authority to warrant, and to sell in the usual way:
Ahern v. Goodspeed, 72 N.Y. io8; l ayor v. Dean, 115 N.Y.
557; Kircher v. Conrod, 9 Mont. 191.
In sales "by sample," it may be that an agent has implied
authority to warrant that the property shall be equal to the
sample: Nelson v. Cowing, 3 Hill, 330; Randall v. Kehior,
6o.Me. 47.
But in sales "by sample," the law implies a warranty of
similarity, whether the agent does or does not expressly war-
rant it. This will be more fully treated of under the subject
of implied warranties.
In Upton v. Suffolk Coaity Mils, i i Cush. 586, a valuable
case, it was distinctly held that a general selling agent, in the
absence of any usage or custom to that effect, has no authority
to warrant that the flour sold by him shall keep sweet during
a sea voyage from Boston to San Francisco, in which it must
twice cross the equator. And in Palmer v. Hatcli, 46 Mo.
585, it was held that an agent to sell whiskey had not
authority to warrant against its seizure for former violation
of revenue laws. Some American courts certainly seem to
hold that a general agent to sell has power to warrant, with-
out any express authority or any custom or usage to that
effect, unless he is positively forbidden to warrant: Deming v.
Chase, 48 Vt. 382; A urray v. Brooks, 41 Iowa, 45; Bier-
hause v. Talmage, 103 Ind. 270; Fattv. Osborne, 33 Minn. 98.
But since a warranty is confessedly no natural or necessary
part of a contract of sale, but only a collateral or independent
agreement, though given, of course, on the occasion of a sale,
it is difficult to see where the agent gets such authority unless
expressly or impliedly from the principal, or how a mere
authority "to sell" gives power to make another contract,
not a necessary or usual part of "selling:" 'Vait v. Bone,
123 N. Y. 604.
Of course, an unauthorized warranty of an agent may be
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ratified; but a mere receipt of the proceeds of the sale by the
principal, in ignorance of an unauthorized warranty, will not
be a ratification: Smith v. Tracey, 36 N. Y. 79; Combs v.
Scott, 12 Allen, 493.
As to what circumstances will be sufficient evidence of
an authority to warrant .by an agent, see Smilie v. Hobbs,
64 N. H. 75; Churchill v. Palmer, I 15 Mass. 31 o; Eadie v.
Ashbaugh, 43 Iowa, 519; Melby v. Osborne, 33 Minn. 492.
Implied Warranty may be implied from the acts of the
parties or from custom or usages, or may be created by
operation of law. The warranty of title is the most sweeping,
as by a contract of sale the seller impliedly warrants to sell
the goods as absolute owner free from liens and charges,
unless the circumstances of the sale show that the seller is
transferring only such property as he may have in the goods;
Clahner's Digest, § 616 ; Dorr v. Fisher, I Cush. 273 ; Mer-
riden National Bank v. Gallaudet,. 120 N. Y. 298.
Implied warranties are created by law, or spring from facts
arising at the time of sale, from what the parties did rather than
what they said. They are contracts to be sure, but silent con-
tracts, and certain rules prevail as to their existence, or non-
existence. No implied warranty of quality ordinarily arises
where there is an express warranty of some other quality.
The demand by the buyer, for one warranty, is supposed to
indicate an intention to desire no other. "Exapressio unius est
exclusio alterius." This is especially enforced where the ex-
press warranty is in writing: Jackston v. Langston, 61 Ga.
392; Baldwin v. VanDeusen, 37 N. Y. 487; McGraw v.
Fletcher, 35 Mich. io4; Mullain v. Thomas, 43 Conn. 252:
DeMitt v. Berry, 134 U. S. 313; Chandler v. Thompson, 30
Fed. Rep. 38.
But it has been thought in South Carolina that an express
warranty of quality does not exclude the implied.warranty of
title, nor vice versa, and that they can subsist together; one a
contract by law, the "other by the parties: Timmierv. Thomip-
son, io S. C. 164; Wells v. Spears, i McCord, 421.
i. Title. It is universally agreed in America also, that in
every sale of personal property by one in possession thereof,
71o
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selling in his own right as absolute owner, there is an implied
warranty of ownership, making him liable if it be not so,
whether he made any express assertion of ownership or not,
or whether he knew of any defects in his title oc not; the sale
itself is an assertion of ownership. This applies to sales of
incorporeal property, rights, and choses in action, as well as
chattels : Marshall v. Duke, 51 Ind. 62 ; Lindsay v. Lamb, 24
Ark. 224; Thurston v. Spratt, 52 Me. 202; Shattuck v.
Greene, 104 Mass. 42; Wood v. Sheldon, 42 N. J. Law, 421 ;
Krumbhaarv. Birch, 83 Pa. 426; Giffen v. Baird, 62 N.Y. 229;
Gookin v. Graham, 5 Humph. (Tenn.) 48o.
This implied warranty of title exists although the vendor
signs and delivers to the buyer the bill of sale under which he
himself acquired his chattels, which is silent on the subject of
warranty: Shattuhck v. Green, 1o4 Mass. 102.
If his own bill of sale had contained an express warranty
of title, and he had assigned the same to his vendee with all
the conditions therein described that might amount to an
express warranty on his part: Long v. Anderson, 62 Ind. 537.
Of course, a warranty of title is a warranty of a free and
perfect title; and is broken by any prior incumbrances, mort-
gages, pledges or liens on the property: Dresser v. Ainsworth,
9 Barb. 619.
And whatever amount the vendee may be obliged to pay
the prior incumbrances, he can recover of his vendor, or
deduct it from the price, if he has not paid for the goods:
Sargent v. Currier, 49 N. H. 31o; Harper v. Dotson, 43 Iowa,
232.
If vendor is in possession there is always an implied war-
ranty, if out of possession there is none: Scranton v. Clark,
39 N.Y. 220; Meriden Nat'l Bank v. Callaudet, 12o N.Y. 299.
All agree that by possession is not meant actual custody,
occupation or physical keeping, but includes all constructive
possession, such as possebsion by bailee, or agent of the
vendor, etc., the word possession, must have a broad con-
struction: Whitby v. Haytwood, 6 Cush. 82; Shattuck v. Green,
1O4 Mass. 45.
In New York, the warranty is not broken until the buyer is
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discharged in his possession: Burt v. Dewey, 4o N. Y. 283;
Bardwell v. Colley, 45 N. Y. 494.
In this country there is also an implied warranty of identity,
viz.: that the artidles shall be of the kind or species it purports
to be, or is described to be; that is, that the article delivered
shall be the same thing contracted for. This, in England, is
-called an implied condition; in America, an implied warranty.
In the former country it is called a condition, because the
,vendee has more right of return in case of breach of condition
than he has for breach of warranty, and so it is more favorable
for him to hold it a breach of condition. But, as there is in
America a generally recognized right of return for breach of
-warranty, as well as for breach of condition, the practical dif-
,ference between the two countries is slight.
Warranty of genuineness in the sale of commercial paper
,comes under this head; a warranty that it really is what it
purports to be-a real note, and. not a false one. On every
such sale the vendor impliedly guarantees (a) that the sig-
,natures to the paper 'are genuine, and not forged: Herrick v.
hitney, I5 Johns. 240; Thrall v. Newell, 19 Vt. 202; Wor-
.thington v. Coles, 112 Mass. 30; Ross v. Terry, 63 N. Y. 613;
Wardv. Haggard, 75 Ind. 381. Though, of course, no such
-warranty is implied when the vendor at the sale expressly
xefuses to warrant the genuineness: Bell v. Dagg, 6o N. Y.
.528. The doctrine of Baxter v. Durand, 29 Me. 434, and o
-Fiser, v. Rieean, 12 Md. 497, that this implied warranty of
genuineness of signature does not apply where a note is sold
in market, like other goods and effects as an article of mer-
chandise, but only where it passes in payment of a debt, can
hardly be supported. In both cases alike, the thing trans-
ferred is not what it purports to be, but only a semblance of it.
It is not a question of quality, but of kind or species. It is
-not a contract at all, if forged. And as goods and chattels
-sold must conform to their name and description, and be what
they purport to be, so- must a note: Hussey v. Libley, 66 Me.
J92 ; Merriam v. Walcott, 3 Allen, 259.
(b) That the signers are competent to contract, and not
miners, &c..: Lobdefl v. Baker, i Met. 192.
W NVARRANTY.
(c) But not ordinarily that they are pecuniarily responsible
or solvent; for this is a warranting of quality of the article:
Day v. Kinney, 131 Mass. 37 ; Birgess v. Chapin, 5 R. I. 225.
There is no doubt, therefore, that the article delivered must
correspond in species and kind with that sold: Lamb v. Crafts,
12 Met. 353.
Some words of quality may be so positive and definite as
not to be merely expressions of opinion or recommendation,
but words of positive affirmance. In such cases they may be
-considered as warranties of quality as well as kind: Forcheirner
v. Stewart, 65 Iowa, 593; Chislolm v. Proadfort, 15 Up. Can.
Q. B. 203.
The maxim of caveat emptor is universally adopted in
America, save, perhaps, in South Carolina, and therefore,
in the sale of an existing specific chattel inspected" or
selected by the buyer, or subject to his inspection, there is
no implied warranty of .quality; or, as sometimes stated
"a sound price does not in and of itself, import of sound
quality." The doctrine of caveat emptor, however, has so
many limitations that it must be read in the light of what
are sometimes called exceptions, but which are really inde-
pendent rules and principles. The purchaser must examine
for himself the article offered to him for sale, and exercise
his own judgment respecting it. If he purchases without
examination or after a hasty examination, or in mere reliance
upon the seller, and the article turns out to be defective, it
is his own fault, and he has no remedy against the seller
unless the latter expressly warrants the article, or made
a fraudulent *representation concerning it,.or knowing it to be
defective, used some art to disguise it. This is the leading
maxim of law relating to the contract of sale; and its appli-
cation is not affected by the circumstance that the price is
such as is usually given for a sound commodity; 1 Smith's
-Leading Cases, 78; 2 Kent's Commentaries, 478.
It seems to have been originally applicable not to the
quality but the title of the goods sold. In modern law, how-
ever, the rule is, that if the seller has possession of the article
and sells it as his own, and not as agent for another, and for
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a fair price, he is understood to warrant the title: 2 Kent's
Commentarics, 478; Ryan v. Ulner, IO8 Pa. 332; Bryant v.
Pembler, 45 Vt. 487; Hadley v. Clinton, etc., Co., 13 Ohio, 502 ;*
Day v. Poole, 52 N. Y. 416; Drew v. Rose, 41 Conn. 50;
M4forris v. Thompson, 85 Ill. 16; Bowman v. Clemmer, 50 Ind.
Io; Richardson v. Bouck, 42 Iowa, 185; West v. Cunniham,
9 Porter (Ala.), IO4; Jonson v. Powers, 65 Cal. 181.
In South Carolina, from the earliest time, it has been held
that "selling for a sound price raises, in law, a warranty of
soundness to the seller." The earliest reported cases being:
Fimrod v. Shoolbred, i Bay, 324 , Crawford v. WilcoX, 2 Mill,
353;- Plwinkle v. Cramer, 27 S. C. 376.
Where the parties have not an equal opportunity of exami-
nation, but the seller has the better, or where the buyer relies
on seller's skill, knowledge, or experience, the risk of quality
falls on the seller, and he is said to warrant impliedly the
quality of the goods sold.
In sales actually made by sample there is an implied war-
ranty that the bulk shall be of equal quality to the sample:
Hughes v. Gray, 6o Cal. 284; Wilcox v. Howard, 51 Ga. 298;
1Webstcr v. Granger, 78 Ill. 230; MJ1'er v. Wheeler, 65 Iowa, 390;
Proctor v. Spratley, 78 Va. 254; Osborne v. Gant&, 6o N. Y.
540.
In sales by sample there is no warranty that there is no
latent defrct in the sample or in the bulk; they must be alike,
but neither of them need be perfect. We speak of sellers
merely; whether it be otherwise or not as to manufacturers,
we will examine later; Bradley v. Manly, 13 Mass. 139.
But there may be an express warranty of quality in goods
sold by sample as well as in other cases, and in such instances
a breach of the warranty of quality is actionable, although the
goods might be equal to the sample: Goold v. Stein, 149 Mass.
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In DeVitt v. Berry, 134 U. S. 306, it was held tLat no im-
plied warranty of quality exists in sales by sample. Pennsyl-
vania, however, has a modified rule on this subject, holding
apparently that an ordinary sale by sample does not imply any
warranty that the quality of the bulk shall be the same as that
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of the sample, but only that the bulk must be of the same
species or kind as the sample, and also shall be merchant-
able: Boyd v. Wilson, 83 Pa. 319; West Republic Co. v. Jones,
io8 Pa. 55.
To constitute a sale by sample in the legal sense of the
term, it must appear that the parties contracted solely in refer-
ence to the sample or article exhibited, and that both mutually
understood they were dealing with the sample, with an under-
standing that the bulk was like it: Beirne v. Dord, 5 N. Y.
95 ; Day v. Raquet, 14 Minn. 282-
Or, as sometimes stated, to raise the implied warranty of
conformity between sample and bulk, it must appear that the
alleged sale by sample was really such; that the portion shown
was intended and understood to be a standard of the quality
and not merely that it was in fact taken from the brlk. If
that was all that was understood, it would not raise the im-
plied warranty. Merely showing a portion of the goods
instead of the whole, does not necessarily constitute a sale by
sample: Selser v. Roberts, 1O5 Pa. 242; Proctor v. Spratley,
78 Va. 254; Ames v.Jones, 77 N. Y. 614.
Whether a sale was strictly by sample, or whether the
buyer acted on his own judgment is ordinarily a question for
the jury: Waring v. Mason, 18 Wend. 445.
When implied warranties arise:
(i) In a sale of goods by description there is a double
warranty. (a) that the goods shall correspond to the de-
scription, and (b) that the goods shall be of a merchantable
quality and condition: Hawkins v. Pemberton, 51 N. Y. 198 ;
Walcott v. Mount, 36 N. J. Law, 262 ; Morse v. Union Stock
Yards Co., 21 Ore. 289; Murchie v. Cornell, 155 Mass. 5o;
Clalner's Digest, § 16.
As to the first proposition, Rogers, J., in Borrekins v. Bevan,
3 Rawle, 23, 43, said: "In all sales there is an implied war-
ranty that the article corresponds in specie with the commodi-
ties sold. It may be safely ruled, that a sample or description
in a sale-note, advertisement, bill of parcels, or invoice, is
equivalent to an express warranty, that the goods are what
they are described, or represented to be by the vendor."
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There is no doubt that in a contract of sale words of descrip-
tion are held to constitute a warranty that the articles sold are
of the species and quality so described: Hogins v. Plymnpton,
ii Pick. 97; Windsor v. Lombard, i8 Pick. 57; Bach v. Levy,
ioI N. Y . 511 ; Fleck v. Weatherton, 20 Wis. 392; Webber v.
Davis, 44 Me. 147.
As an inspection of the goods is necessary to enable the
buyer to ascertain whether they answer the description by
which they were sold, it follows that the seller is bound to
give the buyer an opporturity to make such inspection, and an
acceptance for that purpose will not be a waiver of the right
to object: Doane v. Dunham, 79 Ill. 13 1.
Goods not equal to sample or description, may be rejected
by the buyer, but if he accepts them he may recover on the
warrafity: Cox v. Long, 69 N. C. 7; Rogers v. Niles, i i Ohio,
48; Field v. Kinnear, 4 Kan. 476; Bootkby v. Plaisted, 5i
N. H. 436.
As to the second proposition, their merchantable quality
and condition, we find, where goods are sold by description
and not by the buyers selection or order, and without any
opportunity for inspection, there is ordinarily an implied
warranty, not only that they conform to the description in
kind and species as before stated, but also that they are mer-
chantable; not that they are of the first quality or the second
quality, but that they are not so inferior as to be unsalable
among merchants or dealers in the article; i. e., that they are
free from any remarkable defects. In such sales the doctrine
of caveat emptor does not apply. This is especially true
where the vendor is the manufacturer, or the sale is executory
for future delivery: Gallagherv. Waring, 9 Wend. 28; Brant-
ly v. Thomas, 22 Tex. 270; McClung v. Kelly, 21 Iowa, 5o8;
Fogel v. Brubaker, 122 Pa. 15 ; Hood v. Block, 29 W. Va. 445.
An exception to this rule was held to exist in Clicago, etc.,
Co. v. Tilton, 87 Ill. -I 8o, where both parties were dealers in a
board of trade, under i-ules providing that one who took prop-
erty without inspection, took it at his own risk. This implied
warranty of merchantability by a manufacturer, has some-
times been implied even when there was express warranties as
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to other qualities, which were silent on this particular subject:
Wilcox v. Owens, 64 Ga. 6o i ; Men-iam v. Field, 24 Wis. 640.-
But in a recent case, in the Supreme Court of the United
States, it was held that an express warranty of quality,
excludes any implied warranty of merchantibility, especially
if accompanied by the delivery and acceptance of a sample
as such: DeWitt v. Berry, 13 4 U. S. 306; Cosgrove v. Bennett,.
32 Minn. 371.
(2) Where the buyer, relying on the seller's skill or judg-
ment, orders goods for a particular purpose, known to the.
seller, which is in the course of seller's busifiess to supply,
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for
such purpose: Chahner's Digest, § 17; Randall v. Newson,
2 Q. B. Div. 102; Hoe v. Sanborn, 21 N. Y. 552; Rodgers v.
Niles, i i Ohio, 48.
In purchases for a particular use made known to the seller,
if the buyer relies on the vendor's judgment to select, and not
on his own, there is an implied warranty that the article fur-
nished is reasonably fit and suitable for that purpose: Morse v..
Union Stock Yard Co., 21 Ore. 289.
This is more obvious when the seller is also the manufac-
turer, but it is equally true when he is only a merchant; pro--
vided always, that the buyer in fact relies upon the seller's
judgment, and does not inspect for himself: Duszane v. Bene-
diet, 120 U. S. 630.
As example, a sale of barrels to be filled with whiskey,
implies that they will not leak: Poland v. .liller, 95 Ind. 387;
Pacific Iron Works v. Newhell, 34 Conn. 67; Howard v. Hoey,.
33 Wend. 350; Rease v. Sabin, 38 Vt. 432; Byers v. Chapin,
28 Ohio, 300.
It must be distinctly borne in mind, however, that this
implied warranty of fitness does not arise (in the absence of
fraud) when the buyer selects his own articles on his own
judgment, although the vendor (not being a manufacturer).
knows it is intended for a particular purpose. If the pur--
chaser gets the exact article he buys, and buys the very thing
he gets, he takes the risk of fitness for the intended use:
Deming v. Foster, 48 N. H. I65; Heglt v. Bacon, 126 Mass.
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io; Walker v. Pite, 57 Md. 155; Armstrong v. Bufford,
5I Ala. 4 1o; Port Carbon Iron Co. v. Groves, 68 Pa. 149.
(3) In a sale by a manufacturer there is an implied war-
ranty that the goods are of the seller's own manufacture:
Chalmer's Digest, § 17; Johnson v. Raylton, 7 Q. B. Div. 438.
(4) In addition to all other implied warranties, it is possible
that custom and usage, if sufficiently well established, may
modify, enlarge, or restrict warranties usually created by law.
Thus, in Schnitzner v. Oriental Print Works, 144 Mass. 123,
it was held that, in a sale of Persian berries in bags by sample,
a custom might be shown that the sample represented only the
average quality of the entire lot, and not the average quality of
the contents of each bag taken separately; if so, the buyer
would have no remedy merely because the average of one bag
fell below the sample, if in fact the average of the entire quan-
tity, taken as whole, did conform to the standard. But a
usage that in sales by sample there is an implied warranty
against latent defects is invalid and illegal: Dickinson v. Gay,
7 Allen, 29; Cdxe v. Heisley, 19 Pa. 243.
So a usage that plain words of representation, merely in
their ordinary sense, shall be understood as words of warranty
is invalid: Weatherill v. Nileson, 20 Pa. 448.
Conversely, a usage derogating from the common law rule
of implied warranties is invalid; as a usage that a manufac-
turer does not impliedly warrant against latent defects in the
article he is manufacturing is inoperative against a written con-
tract from which the law would imply such warranty: Whit-
more v. South Boston Iron Co., 2 Allen, 52.
Remedies:
A right of action for breach of warranty exists, although
the vendor had expressly agreed to take back the property
in case it did not correspond with the warranty. The right
to return is merely accumulative remedy: Douglass Axe Co.
v. Gardner, Io Cush. 88; Perrine v. Serrell, 30 N. J. Law, 454;
OfcCornack v. Dunvie, 36 Iowa, 645. Unless the buyer ex-
pressly agrees that the thing shall be returned if defective,
in which case he may not have a right to keep it and sue
on the warranty: Bomberger v. Griener, 18 Iowa, 477. And,
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although the buyer has exercised his right of return, an action
for breach of warranty will lie for any actual damages thereby
sustained before such return: Clark v. McGatchie, 49 Iowa,
437; Kinballv. Vorman, 35 Mich. 310.
The mere fact of acceptance and use of the goods, even
after knowledge of the defect, does not prevent a resort to an
action upon a warranty, or for fraud. The buyer need not
return them, nor offer to do so, nor give any notice, in order
to sue upon his warranty: Wareing v. Mfason, I8 Wend. 426;
Vincent v. Leland, IOO Mass. 432; Fisk v. Tank, 12 Wis. 277;
Hughes v. Bray, 6o Minn. 284; Kellogg v. Denslow, 14 Conn.
41".
No doubt a failure to return the goods or notify the vendor
of the defect after sufficient opportunity to examine them, may
be some evidence that no defect existed, but it is not a condi-
tion precedent to the action, nor in law, a waiver of the war-
ranty, though some states seem to hold it so, especially in
executory contracts, and when the defects are apparent:
Dozince v. Dow, 64 N. Y. 4I I; Defenbaugh v. W.eaver, 87 Ill.
132. But it seems to be a question of fact for the jury in each
case, under proper instructions from the court.
An action for a breach of warranty may be maintained
although the goods are not paid for, or though notes for the
price are still outstanding: Aultman v. Wheeler, 49 Iowa, 647;
Frohreich v. Gammon, 28 Minn. 476; Creighton v. Comstock,
27 Ohio, 548. Or, although the buyer has sold the goods
and no claim has been made on him for the alleged defects:
Mfuller v. Eno, 14 N. Y. 598.
An action may legally be sustained upon h warranty, although
the buyer allows the seller to recover judgment for the full
price because he did not set up the defence. The failure to
rely upon the defect is only a matter of evidence as to the non-
existence of such defence: Bodurtha v. Phelon, 13 Gray, 413.
and vice versa: Barker v. Cleveland, 19 Mich. 23o. But no
action will lie on a warranty unless the title has fully passed
to the buyer.
The general rule of damages in actions upon a warranty is
too well settled to require citation, viz : the value of an article
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corresponding to the warranty, minus the value of the article
actually received. And this seems to be so both in express
and implied warranties: Cohers v. Keever, 4 Pa. i68; Corn-
stock v. Hutchinson, I o Barb. 211 ; Rutan v. Ludlam, 29 N.J.
Law, 398.
And it is immaterial that the purchaser subsequently sold
the article for a higher price than he paid: Brown v. Bigelow,
IO Allen, 242.
As to special or consequential damages not quite so much
unanimity exists: See Thorns v. Dingfsley, 70 Me. Ioo. In that
case the expense of taking out defective carriage springs and
inserting others in their place was allowed.
In a sale of seeds to a market gardener, known to be for
his own use, that being considered an implied warranty of fit-
ness for that special use, the buyer may recover as damages
the difference between the value of the crop raised from the
seed and the value of what a crop would have been raised
from such seed as they were warranted to be: IWVoolcott v.
IWount, 36 N. J. Law, 262 ; White v. .Viller, 71 N. Y. i 18
Van Wyck v. Allen, 69 N. Y. 61.
Gains prevented, as well as losses sustained, may be some-
times recovered if they can be clearly established by the
evidence as natural results of the breach of warranty. Giffin
v. Colver, 16 N. Y. 489; Messmore v. N. Y. Steel and Lead'
Co., 40 N. Y. 422. EDGAR H. RosENSTOCK.
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